Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation:

A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.

Document identifier: oai:dalea.du.se:2594
Keyword: Informal sanctions, Natural experiments, Voluntary contributions, Conditional cooperation, Allemansrätten
Publication year: 2006
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Abstract:

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Authors

Tobias Heldt

Högskolan Dalarna; Nationalekonomi
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    header: 
        identifier: oai:dalea.du.se:2594
        datestamp: 2021-04-15T12:25:22Z
        setSpec: SwePub-du
    metadata: 
        mods: 
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                version: 3.7
            recordInfo: 
                recordContentSource: du
                recordCreationDate: 2007-03-30
            identifier: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-2594
            titleInfo: 
                @attributes: 
                    lang: eng
                title: Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation:
                subTitle: A natural experiment \non voluntary contributions to a public good.
            abstract: 
In a natural experiment this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts one with and one without an informal sanctioning system are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

            subject: 
                    @attributes: 
                        lang: eng
                    topic: Informal sanctions
                    @attributes: 
                        lang: eng
                    topic: natural experiments
                    @attributes: 
                        lang: eng
                    topic: voluntary contributions
                    @attributes: 
                        lang: eng
                    topic: conditional cooperation
                    @attributes: 
                        lang: eng
                    topic: Allemansrätten
            language: 
                languageTerm: eng
            genre: 
                conference/other
                vet
            note: 
                Published
                1
            name: 
                @attributes: 
                    type: personal
                    authority: du
                namePart: 
                    Heldt
                    Tobias
                role: 
                    roleTerm: aut
                affiliation: 
                    Högskolan Dalarna
                    Nationalekonomi
                nameIdentifier: 
                    the
                    0000-0001-5031-3863
            originInfo: 
                dateIssued: 2006
                place: 
                    placeTerm: Nottingham UK
            relatedItem: 
                @attributes: 
                    type: host
                titleInfo: 
                    title: Economic Science Association
            location: 
                url: http://du.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:521690/FULLTEXT01.pdf
            accessCondition: gratis
            physicalDescription: 
                form: electronic
            typeOfResource: text