Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation:
A natural experiment
on voluntary contributions to a public good.
Document identifier: oai:dalea.du.se:2594
Keyword: Informal sanctions,
Natural experiments,
Voluntary contributions,
Conditional cooperation,
AllemansrättenPublication year: 2006Relevant Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):
The SDG label(s) above have been assigned by OSDG.aiAbstract: In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.
Authors
Tobias Heldt
Högskolan Dalarna; Nationalekonomi
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header:
identifier: oai:dalea.du.se:2594
datestamp: 2021-04-15T12:25:22Z
setSpec: SwePub-du
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recordCreationDate: 2007-03-30
identifier: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-2594
titleInfo:
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lang: eng
title: Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation:
subTitle: A natural experiment \non voluntary contributions to a public good.
abstract: In a natural experiment this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts one with and one without an informal sanctioning system are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.
subject:
@attributes:
lang: eng
topic: Informal sanctions
@attributes:
lang: eng
topic: natural experiments
@attributes:
lang: eng
topic: voluntary contributions
@attributes:
lang: eng
topic: conditional cooperation
@attributes:
lang: eng
topic: Allemansrätten
language:
languageTerm: eng
genre:
conference/other
vet
note:
Published
1
name:
@attributes:
type: personal
authority: du
namePart:
Heldt
Tobias
role:
roleTerm: aut
affiliation:
Högskolan Dalarna
Nationalekonomi
nameIdentifier:
the
0000-0001-5031-3863
originInfo:
dateIssued: 2006
place:
placeTerm: Nottingham UK
relatedItem:
@attributes:
type: host
titleInfo:
title: Economic Science Association
location:
url: http://du.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:521690/FULLTEXT01.pdf
accessCondition: gratis
physicalDescription:
form: electronic
typeOfResource: text