Consequentialism in infinite worlds

Document identifier: oai:DiVA.org:ltu-76012
Access full text here:10.1093/analys/anz078
Keyword: Natural Sciences, Mathematics, Probability Theory and Statistics, Naturvetenskap, Matematik, Sannolikhetsteori och statistik, Humanities and the Arts, Philosophy, Ethics and Religion, Philosophy, Humaniora och konst, Filosofi, etik och religion, Filosofi, Mathematical Analysis, Matematisk analys, Applied Mathematics, Tillämpad matematik
Publication year: 2020
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Abstract:

We show that in infinite worlds, the following three conditions are incompatible: 1) The spatiotemporal ordering of individuals is morally irrelevant. 2) All else being equal, the act of bringing about a good outcome with a high probability is better than the act of bringing about the same outcome with a low probability. 3) One act is better than another only if there is a nonzero probability that it brings about a better outcome. The impossibility of combining these conditions shows that it is more costly to endorse 1) than has been previously acknowledged.

Authors

Adam Jonsson

Luleå tekniska universitet; Matematiska vetenskaper
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Martin Peterson

Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, USA
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